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This thesis focuses on the security of automated vehicle platoons. Specifically, it
examines the vulnerabilities that occur via disruptions of the information flows among the
different types of sensors, the communications network and the control unit in each vehicle
of a platoon. Multiple security domain nondeducibility is employed to determine whether
the system can detect attacks. The information flows among the various domains provide
insights into the vulnerabilities that exist in the system by showing if an attacker’s actions
cannot be deduced. If nondeducibility is found to be true, then an attacker can create an
undetectable attack. Defeating nondeducibility requires additional information sources,
including invariants pertaining to vehicle platoon operation. A platoon is examined from
the control unit perspective to determine if the vulnerabilities are associated with preventing
situational awareness, which could lead to vehicle crashes.
Keywords: Automated vehicle platoons, multiple security domain nondeducibility
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1. INTRODUCTION
Automated vehicle systems are likely to be the future of transportation. With the
advent of VANETS (vehicular ad-hoc networks)[1] many vehicles are able to communicate
through a wireless channel. The real time application of a vehicle platoon where 8-25 cars
follow one another and mimic the actions performed by the vehicle in front of it is new but
the concept of a vehicle platoon was introduced in PATH (Partners for Advanced Transit and
Highways) project in 1986 [2] that demonstrated the benefits of a vehicle platoon. It was
believed that the introduction of platoons would increase the capacity of the roads, reduce
trip delays and limit energy consumption. The PATH program would also avoid accidents
and breakdowns since more than 95% of accidents were caused by careless drivers and
vehicle breakdowns [2].
People are often a little hesitant to trust the decision making of a driverless car.
While cruise control has existed for some time, this only controls the speed but with
the arrival of autonomous technology, other characteristics of a vehicle such as braking,
maneuvering and acceleration can also be controlled. When the concept of a driverless
vehicle is expanded to a vehicle platoon as shown in Figure 1.1, the information flow should
be secure and any discrepancy in the distance or speed should be identified immediately.
The goal of cyber-physical security is to figure out the cause of the discrepancy because
once the source of the incorrect information is identified, appropriate steps can be taken to
safeguard the infrastructure (i.e., to discard or repair). The information that is given out by
the components of the vehicles needs to be protected.
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Self-driving vehicles from Tesla and Google are already in the market and have been able to
Figure 1.1. A vehicle platoon
(From https://static.dreamstime.com/t/car-line-art-vector-illustrations-48227977.jpg)
successfully demonstrate these vehicles in real traffic. These vehicles are able to handle all
the driving. These cars are well equipped to detect pedestrians, cyclists, vehicles, road work
and more from a distance of up to two football fields in all directions. It is logical to assume
that in the coming years we would see more of self-driving vehicles and communication
between vehicles is a distinct possibility.
Self-driving autonomous vehicles utilize technologies like GPS, 360-degree camera
systems, sensors, beacons and powerful onboard processing computers. This gives the
attacker a variety of path choices to attack but our infrastructure utilizes these information
paths in such a way that even if a few paths are compromised, the remaining would help us
identify the compromised path/vehicle.
The attack would be undetectable if the model is non-deducible because the vehicle
would not know that there is a component in the car that has been compromised. The
main contribution of the thesis is to devise a cyber-physical platoon model where an attack
would be deducible and if possible alert the vehicle about the compromised source. We are
trying to create security domains in such a way that if an attack occurs in one domain, then
3
the compromised domain could be detected with the help of information paths from other
domains. The presented work and its various case scenarios demonstrate the potential to
detect security issues in a cyber-physical system.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows Section 2 presents the system model.
Section 3 gives the related work, Section 4 presents the problems, attempted solutions and




The following describes how the vehicle platoon works [3]:
1. The lead vehicle(LV) decides the movement of the platoon. Lead vehicle is defined
as the vehicle in front of the platoon. The vehicles behind the LV follow it.
2. The vehicles in the platoon receive this information from the previous vehicle and
maneuver it accordingly.
3. If the LV wants to slow down or take a turn, it indicates this in the beacon and the
vehicles follow suit.
4. Each vehicle checks and compares the information it receives through the sensors
and from the communication network. If the information is consistent, it proceeds
otherwise it raises a flag.
5. Other vehicles check the flagged car information and then decide to either keep the
car in the platoon or remove it.
When communication between autonomous vehicles comes to mind people think of
VANETs (vehicular ad-hoc networks). Although there are many benefits of VANETs, they
have a drawback when it comes to scalability since each vehicle in VANETs is connected
to all other vehicles and there are n2 connections required for n vehicles. Each vehicle
in the single platoon model is connected directly to the vehicle ahead, behind and to the
lead vehicle (since each vehicle mimics the lead vehicle) which reduces the number of
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connections from n to 3. Each platoon has a lead vehicle and all the lead vehicles of
the platoon are connected. In this way, all the vehicles stay connected and the scalability
problem is reduced.
Figure 2.1. Information transfer
This cyber-physical system consists of a computer such as the control unit and a
physical system, which in our case is the car. Information flows between different security
domains. The security domain can be labeled as “secure” or “non secure”. Our model
includes the following :
1. Communication network
Our model can use any wireless networking technology as its basis, the most
prominent of which are short-range radio technologies like WLAN (either standard
Wi-Fi and ZigBee). In addition, cellular technologies or LTE can be used. In the
United States, the IEEE 1609 WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments)
protocol stack builds on IEEE802.11pWLANoperating on seven reserved channels in
the 5.9 GHz frequency band. The WAVE protocol stack is designed to provide multi-
channel operation (even for vehicles equipped with only a single radio), security, and
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lightweight application layer protocols. Within the IEEE Communications Society,
there is a technical subcommittee on Vehicular Networks and Telematics Applications
(VNTA). A control unit captures this information. Beacon messages are passed on
this network
2. Sensors
Velodyne LiDAR sensors are designed for obstacle detection and navigation
of autonomous ground vehicles and marine vessels. Its durability, 360 field of view
and very high data rate makes this sensor ideal for the most demanding perception
applications as well as 3D mobile data collection and mapping applications. The
HDL-64E’s innovative laser array enables navigation andmapping systems to observe
more of their environment than any other LiDAR sensor. The information received
from the LiDAR would be sent to the control unit. RADAR sensors are devices used
in advanced cruise control systems that can direct a vehicle’s accelerator and braking
systems, controlling the distance between it and another vehicle. The radar sensors
note vital information such as range, angle and Doppler velocity. This information is
used to determine the driving situation and warn the driver in potentially dangerous
events. If the driver does not take appropriate action in time and a crash is about to
happen, advanced radar systems can take control of the vehicle to avoid the crash or
lessen the accident’s severity. This high level of safety functionality is maintained in
bad weather and no light, when driving conditions are at their worst.
Our model is independent of the sensor type. We only deal with the information that
the sensor gives, we assume both give us accurate readings.
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3. Control Unit
This is the brain of the system and gives the vehicle directions. Based on
the inputs it receives from various sources, the control unit makes decisions. If
discrepancy in information path is detected, the control unit would alert other vehicles
by sending special-purpose messages. Special-purpose messages are messages sent
out to address specific issues.
4. Monitor
We will be using the invariant equation distance=speed ? time(t) to make a
calculation of where the vehicle might be at time t. An invariant is defined as a func-
tion, quantity, or property that remains unchanged when a specified transformation is
applied. The assumption is that the car would have its own speed calculation mecha-
nism like the speedometer and a clock that would give the time. At each instance, a
monitor would be able to compute the distance information and send it to the control
unit. The monitor uses a checker to evaluate each information source with another to
see if they match. This will be further explained in detail in the case studies.
The messages (information regarding the speed and distance) are passed from the
lead vehicle to the corresponding vehicles in the platoon in the form of beacons (messages
that are transmitted in a network from one vehicle to another) as shown in Figure 2.1.
Beacons contain information of the speed and distance of all the vehicles in front of the
present vehicle. A control unit gathers information directly from sensors and also from the
communication network that exist between the vehicles.
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3. RELATEDWORK ON SECURITY
Various security threats from this project arise such as integrity (attacker could
change the information in a beacon), confidentiality (attacker could track the car’s identity)
and availability (attacker could jam the network used for communicating the distance and
speed information). "Attacker" here is defined as someone/something that does not have
authorization to access or modify the car or the components in the system but is able to
modify it. The attacker could do the above attacks to demand money from the owner of a
vehicle, to cause a traffic block or to cause a crash. Some of the devices such as the distance
sensor or the camera, are exposed to the outside environment, so damage to these entities
due to environmental or traffic conditions can cause the devices to malfunction. Many ideas
were proposed to tackle the problem of security.
3.1. PRIVACY
Many works involved securing the entity itself. In [1], Ulrich Lang and Rudolf
Schreiner have tried to use separate access control to prohibit change in the control state-
ments of the car. They have divided each section on the control board and restricted the
information flow based on the type of control it pertains to. They have only worked on
preserving the privacy of the vehicle. They presented a list of security requirements to be
enforced in ICSI (improved cooperative sensing for improved traffic efficiency), the pro-
tection of the ICSI system itself, the application data, and the user privacy. The privacy
protection of vehicles has been worked on as shown in [4]. Here the idea of a virtual trip
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lane (VTL) was used. By using VTL the location and speed reports can be regulated. Based
on these reports, the estimated time of VT L1 is calculated when the vehicle enters from
VT L1 to VT L2 and compared to the actual arrival time in VT L2. They found that the idea
of only releasing trajectory data within VTL zones helps protect privacy.
3.2. INTEGRITY
Work has also been done to secure the information by using encryption mechanisms
as seen in [5], but that model was limited in that it only provided conditional privacy (i.e.,
only the entities involved know about the communication). Recently cyber attacks on the
vehicles were reported. These were done on a Jeep on prior notice to the drivers [6]. They
took control of the ECU(Engine Control Unit), which sends out command to components
in the car. They were able to kill the brakes, steer the vehicle, and control the horn and
parking lights of the car.
There have been many other famous attacks. These have been done via access
directly to the computer’s hardware or through a wireless channel. Some of the cases are
discussed below. In terms of hardware, the main idea of any attacker is to get into the CAN1
of the vehicle through which they would be able to control the car. The vulnerabilities of
the CAN are discussed in [7]. CAN packets contain no authentication fields or even any
source identifier fields, meaning that any component can indistinguishably send a packet to
any other component. This means that any single compromised component can be used to
1Controller Area Network-is a vehicle bus standard designed to allow micro-controllers and devices to
communicate with each other in applications without a host computer
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control all of the other components on that bus. The researchers suggested that by sending
malicious data through broadcast from the infected CAN will make them take charge of the
car. The researchers were able to spoof the data of speed.
The researchers in [7] have worked on wireless access which is discussed in [8].
Through the use of Bluetooth and reverse engineering they were able to gain access to the
ECU. Once access is made, the attacker canmake changes to the braking system, andmodify
the speed. Another recent attack was made on a Tesla S model by researchers from Keen
Security Lab, they too were able to connect to the CAN of the vehicle wireless. The basic
fault comes when the driver connects to a malicious WiFi hotspot nearby. The researchers
in [9] were able to devise an alternate solution for message authentication by using ECDSA
with omission techniques and TESLA++, but the problem of scalability still exists as each
new vehicle has to be authenticated with every other vehicle in a group through an RSU
(road side unit), although their work does reduce the authentication overhead when two
groups would like to communicate. If the information is true, the vehicle is kept otherwise
a special message is raised. The verification is performed by the ECU using the information
from another vehicle.
3.3. AVAILABILITY
Blocking the availability of information is a serious problem in connected vehicles.
Traditional techniques like beamforming (a technique of actively steering the beam of
transmission and reception of a wireless communication system in such a way that useful
signal reception is maximized while interfering signal reception is minimized), were used
to avoid jamming attacks in the sensors [10]. A Sybil attack can be seen in connected
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vehicles. A Sybil attack is one in which an attacker maliciously subverts the reputation
system of a peer-to-peer network system by creating a large number of pseudonymous
identities. Using these identities, the attacker can gain a disproportionately large influence
on the functioning of the system. In [11] they have found an efficient way to detect this attack
through methods that use less complex cryptography techniques and obtaining pseudonyms
from RSU (road side units) at continuous intervals from a trusted source. Distinct RSUs
that periodically collect reports from communicating vehicles regarding this neighborhood
reduce the vulnerability.
In the long term, it is believed that the vehicles involved in the Sybil attack will give
out similar information compared to the benign vehicles. The group of researchers in [12]
tried to use a trust-based system to detect malicious vehicles. This was a very innovative
approach where they used an iterative filtering algorithm to detect the malicious vehicles
to address the problem of coalition. In their method, they could detect that vehicles which
were trying to improve the trust rating of false vehicles. Another set of attacks that can
be easily detected are denial of service (DOS) attacks. In [13] they take time intervals for
listening on the channel and verifying if all the beacons have been received or not. If there
is a beacon loss, then there should be at least two nodes involved in a collision within the
same group, but to achieve this state they need to have an initialization phase. The outcome
of the initialization phase is the sets of vehicle identifiers such as beacons from different
sets never colliding with each other.
Attacks such as the one mentioned in [6], are difficult to detect and mitigate with
only one car. The researchers in [4] used the estimated time traveled by each vehicle in each
VT L1, but we here take the real time data for computation. Therefore, if an attacker were to
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know the position of a vehicle in a virtual trip zone, the attacker would be able to track the
movement of the vehicle in real time. Attackers in [7][8] were able to spoof data coming
from a communication network and the beacon. Cryptography was used to secure the
messages between vehicles in [5] and [9]. Using the strongest encryption method is a good
solution, but there is an assumption in cryptography that keys are exchanged securely before
initiation of communication. In real-time cases such as cars it is not possible to securely
share while the vehicles are in motion. The DOS (denial of service) attacks mentioned in
[10] and [13] are based on reducing interference and listening to the channel periodically,
but the problems arise when there are hazardous weather conditions making it difficult to
listen to the channel.
Multiple Security Domain Nondeducibility (MSDND):
Nondeducibility (ND) was introduced by Sutherland [14] in an attempt to model
infrastructures to secure information in a partitioned model. The partitions are grouped
into two or more sets. These sets are usually labeled as high and low with all information
restricted to one side of the partition or the other. Information that could not be determined
from the other side of the domain is said to be nondeducibility secure. However, the
partition must be absolute and it must be simplistic. Overlapping security domains present
severe difficulties for Sutherland’s Nondeducibility, as do information flows, which cannot
be evaluated because the model lacks the required valuation functions. Let V be the set
of valuation functions such that V isx (w) returns the value of state variable sx as seen by an
entity i in world w. For example, we have a control unit c in our model which gets the
distance information from say sensors ds, then V cds (w) will return the value true if it gets the
information of distance from the sensor otherwise the value will be false.
13
Definition 1 A system is MSDND secure if there exists some world with a pair of states
where one must be true and the other false (exclusive OR), but an entity i has no valuation
function for those states. An entity within the security domain SDi, i cannot know which
state is true and which is false [15].
MSDND(ES) = ∃w ∈ W `  [ ( sx ∨ sy) ] ∧ ∼( sx ∧ sy) ∧ [ w |= ( V ix( w) ∧  V iy( w) ) ]
An equivalent formula is
MSDND(ES) = ∃ w ∈ W `  [ ( sx ⊕ sy) ] ∧ [ w |= ( V ix( w) ∧  V iy( w) ) ]
Where sx and sy are states, V ix and V iy are the valuation functions of x in domain i and y on
domain i and w is a world.
Figure 3.1. Security domains of information flow
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4. PROBLEM STATEMENT
It is possible to devise an attack like a STUXNET attack [16] where the attacker
changes the values of speed and distance, but the model needs to be able to tell if this kind
of attack (change in the information of the sensor or network) is MSDND. If the attack is
MSDND then it is good for the attacker as the model would not know which component
is malfunctioning. Therefore, the model should be designed to eliminate attacks that are
MSDND secure.
Figure 3.1 shows how the security domains are divided and also the interaction
between the car and the communication points. There is a control unit in the car that
computes the movement of the car. If there is a discrepancy in the distance information
sent by one of the paths to the control unit, then the control unit would know that there is
something wrong.
Below are the set of entities c, s, n, ch that can be evaluated to determine the inter-
actions between the car and the communication system. Here,
1. c: the control unit in the car (control unit gets the data and computes the movement
accordingly) .
2. s: sensors (LiDAR) denoted by s that gives distance value d(s).
3. n: communication network between the cars that gives network value d(n).
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Table 4.1. Valuation function
Valuation Result
V cc = s0 ∧ T “true”↔ Control unit is controlling the car
V cdn = s1 ∧ T “true”↔ Control unit gets input from networks
V cds = s2 ∧ T “true”↔ Control unit gets input from sensors
V cch = s3 ∧ T “true”↔ Control unit gets result from checker
4. ch: this is a computational unit inside the control unit that checks if the information
received from the information paths is true. In this case, we have three checkers:
ch1(checks if d(n)=d(s)), ch2(checks if d(s)=d(i)) and ch3(checks if(d(i)=d(n)), where
d(n), d(s) and d(i) are distance information received by the control unit from the
network, sensor and invariant, respectively.
We also have d(c), which is the distance that the control unit accepts based on
information received from the paths. On any given state, the valuation functions will return
the value of the corresponding state variables as seen by the entity in control c, s, n.
The control unit will be able to detect a compromised information path if the
information it receives from the sensor is not equal to the communication network. In other
words it uses the result of ch. If it is false then the control unit would know that one of the
information paths is compromised.
There are two information paths as seen in Figure 1.1, sensors and networks. For
the following case, the vehicle has only one information path either sensor or network that
gives the distance between itself and the car in front of it. This case shows how having one
information path can make the system MSDND secure and also not MSDND secure.
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4.1. WHEN THE CARS CONTAIN ONLY ONE INFORMATION PATH (NET-
WORK OR SENSOR)
Case 1a: Let us assume that the cars are connected only through a network, n and
the network is providing correct information under normal conditions, i.e., d(n)= True.
1. w|= (∃ V cd(n)(w)) Control unit receives distance information from network.
From the above statement,
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W: w `  (d(n)⊕¬d(n)) ∧ [w |= (∃ V cd(n)(w) ∧  V c¬d(n)(w))]
Hence, the system is not nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the
definition since we have ∃V cd(n)(w)). In this case the goal of making the model non deducible
secure is met.
Case 1b: Let us assume that the cars connected through a network, n receive incorrect
information( i.e., ¬d(n)= True). This is possible if an attacker is able to get into the system.
1. w|= ( V c
¬d(n)(w)) Control unit receives distance information from network.
From the above statement,
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W: w `  (d(n)⊕¬d(n)) ∧ [w |= ( V cd(n)(w) ∧  V c¬d(n)(w))]
Hence, the system is nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the
definition. In this case the goal of making the model non deducible secure is not met.
Case 1c: Let us assume that the cars are connected only through s where the sensor is
providing correct information ( i.e., d(s)= True) under normal conditions.
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1. w|= (∃ V cd(s)(w)) Control unit receives distance information from sensor.
From the above statement
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W: w `  (d(s)⊕¬d(s)) ∧ [w |= (∃ V cd(s)(w) ∧  V c¬d(s)(w))]
Hence, the system is not Nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the
definition since we have ∃V cd(s)(w). In this case the goal of making the model non deducible
secure is met
Case 1d: Let us assume that the cars connected through s receive incorrect information
(i.e., ¬d(s)= True). This is possible if the attacker is able to get into the system.
1. w|= ( V c
¬d(s)(w)) Control unit receives distance information from sensor.
From the above statement
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W: w `  (d(s)⊕¬d(s)) ∧ [w |= ( V cd(s)(w) ∧  V c¬d(s)(w))]
Hence, the system is nondeducible secure to the control unit according to the
definition. Similar to case 1b the goal is not met
Although making a model that is not Nondeducible secure is the goal, the control
unit in cases 1b and 1d would believe the data and direct the vehicle. Thus, having no other
information path to verify could be hazardous. So based on our initial observations we can
conclude that having multiple information paths is an important criteria to make the model
not Nondeducible secure.
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4.2. WHEN THE CARS CONTAIN BOTH THE NETWORK AND SENSOR IN-
FORMATION PATH
Now let us assume the cases where we have the sensor and communication network
provide the distance information to the control unit. The control unit would receive the
distance information and based on it would decide if the information provided is correct
or not. The control unit would know that an information path is corrupted if there is a
discrepancy in the information provided by the two paths.
Case 2a: If n is faulty: someone has compromised the system. The attacker is able to
manipulate the information and thus wrong information is received by the control unit from
the network. Here, ¬d(n) = True and d(s) = True.
1. w |= (∃ V cd(s)(w)) Control unit receives information from the sensor
2. w|= ( V c
¬d(n)(w)) Control unit receives information from network
3. w|= (∃V cd(ch)) Information received from sensor and network do not match
From 3, the control unit would know that an information path has been compromised.
By combining above statements 1 and 2 we get
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W:w ` (¬ d(n)⊕ch)∧[w |=(∃ V cd(ch)(w)∧ V c¬d(ch)(w))]
Hence, the system is not nondeducible to the control unit because the control unit
can deduce that something is going wrong, but cannot determine exactly which information
path. An extra information path is needed to indicate which path is responsible for the
incorrect data being transmitted.
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Table 4.2. State description
φi state description
φ0 σ0 Control unit is controlling the car
φ1 σ1 Control unit gets input from networks
φ2 σ2 Control unit gets input from sensors
φ3 σ3 Control unit gets input from invariantdist
φ4 σ4 Control unit gets result from ch1
φ5 σ5 Control unit gets result from ch2
φ6 σ6 Control unit gets result from ch3
Su uncompromised = T uncompromised = φ4 ∧ φ5 ∧ φ6
Sh compromised = T compromised = ¬φ4 ∨ ¬φ5 ∨ ¬φ6
Case 2b: If s is faulty: someone has compromised the system. The attacker is able to
manipulate the information, and hence wrong information is received by the control unit
from network. Here ¬d(s)=True and d(n) = True
1. w |= (V c
¬d(s)(w)) Control unit receives information from the sensor
2. w|= (∃ V cd(n)(w)) Control unit receives information from network
3. w|= ∃Vch1 Information received from sensor and network do not match.
From 3, the control unit would know that an information path has been compromised.
By combining above statements 1 and 2 we get,
MSDND (ES) = ∃ wε W:w `  (¬ d(s)⊕ch)∧ [w|=(∃V cd(ch)(w)∧ V c¬d(s)(w))].
Therefore, the system is not nondeducible to the control unit because the control unit
can deduce that something is going wrong, but cannot determine exactly which information
path is responsible for the incorrect data being transmitted.
Now if we consider the other components in the car like the invariant, we can model
the MSDND model as the following as shown in Figure 4.1:
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Figure 4.1. Invariant model
Here, there are 3 information paths- sensors, networks, and invariant
1. c: the control unit in the car (the control unit gets the data and computes the movement
accordingly)
2. Distance estimators: sensors (LiDAR) denoted by s that give the value of d(s).
3. n: communication network n between the cars that gives the value of d(n).
4. invariantdist(d(i)): distance=speed?time; Every car would have its own speedometer
through which it can calculate the distance it has traveled in a period of time.
5. ch: this is a computational unit inside the control unit that checks if the information
received from the information paths is true. In this case, we have three checkers:
ch1(checks if d(n)=d(s)), ch2(checks if d(s)=d(i)) and ch3(checks if(d(i)=d(n)), where
d(n), d(s) and d(i) are distance information received by control unit from the network,
sensor and invariant, respectively.
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Based on our model, the three sources providing distance information are the following:
dt2 =

range calculated by LIDAR/RADAR − dt1(s)
speed ∗ time − dt1(i)
distance calculated through network − dt1(n)
(4.1)
sensors vs invariant: We assume that that vehicles are driving at constant velocity. At time
1s let us say a sensor has given d(s) as 5m and at that point of time the vehicle is at 30m/sec.
Since there is no change of speed at time 5s in the vehicle then sensor should report d(s)
as 5m. If any other information is given, then we would know that the sensor has been
compromised.
network vs invariant: The network periodically updates the information of speed as
shown in Figure 4.3, location and other relevant information of the vehicle. Now if at time t1
the network gives a certain location of the vehicle Vi+1 and at t2 the network gives a certain
location of Vi+1 Based on this information Vi can calculate the distance moved by Vi+1. It
also has the speed it traveled during this time and can calculate the distance. If there is any
discrepancy in information then we would know that the network has been compromised.
The control unit would have the correct distance information if there exists a valuation
function for any one of the ch1, ch2orch3.
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4.3. WHEN THE CARS HAVE AN ADDITIONAL INVARIANT ADDED AS A SE-
CURITY DOMAIN
Let us now add another information path (invariant) to the model. This additional
information will help us in making the model not MSDND secure. The control unit would
also have the correct distance information if there exists a valuation function for any one of
the ch1, ch2 or ch3 and in this way can indicate which path is compromised.
Case 3a: n is faulty ,i.e., ¬d(n) = True:
1. w |= ( V c
¬d(n)(w)) Control unit receives information from the network.
2. w |= (∃ V cd(s)(w)) Control unit receives information from the distance estimators.
3. w |= (∃ V cd(i)(w)) Control unit receives information from invariantdist .
4. w|= V cch1 .
5. w|= ∃V cch2 .
6. w|= V cch3 .
From 5 we get
7. w|=∃V cd(c)(w).
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W:w ` (¬ d(n)⊕ch2)∧[w |=(∃V cd(ch2)(w)∧ V c¬d(ch2)(w))]
Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong and determine that the network is responsible for the incorrect
data being transmitted.
Case 3b: Let us now consider that the sensor is faulty. The control unit receives incorrect
information from the sensor, s is faulty, i.e., ¬d(s) = True.
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1. w |= (∃ V cd(n)(w)) Control unit receives information from the network.
2. w |= ( V c
¬d(s)(w)) Control unit receives information from the distance estimators.
3. w |= (∃ V cd(i)(w)) Control unit receives information from the invariantdist .
4. w|= V cch1 .
5. w|= V cch2 .
6. w|= ∃V cch3 .
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W:w ` (¬ d(s)⊕ch3∧[w |=(∃V cd(ch3)(w)∧ V c¬d(s)(w))]
Therefore it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong and determine that distance estimators are responsible for the
incorrect data being transmitted.
We have assumed that the invariant is always true and that the information about the
speed is unaltered, but in [6] they can also change the information received to the control
unit. If such a case arises then we would have the other two components, sensor and
network, correctly give us the information as shown in case 3c.
Case 3c: i is faulty, i.e., ¬d(i) = True.
1. w |= (∃ V cd(n)(w)) Control unit receives information from the network.
2. w |= (∃ V c
¬d(s)(w)) Control unit receives information from the distance estimators.
3. w |= ( V cd(i)(w)) Control unit receives information from the invariantdist .
4. w|= ∃V cch1 .
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5. w|= V cch2 .
6. w|= V cch3 .
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W:w ` (¬ d(i)⊕ch1∧[w |=(∃V cd(ch1)(w)∧ V c¬d(i)(w))]
Therefore it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong and determine that invariance is responsible for the incorrect
data being transmitted.
4.4. PLATOON
Let us consider we have different cars in a platoon and also that, there are various
platoons in a vehicle as seen in Figure 4.4. Now the following are sources of information:
1. s: sensors (LiDAR) that give distance value d(s).
2. n: communication network between the cars that gives network value d(n).
3. Invariant1: distance=speed?time which gives the value of d(invarianti); every car
would have its own speedometer through which it could calculate the distance it has
traveled in a period of time
4. In f oSourceValidator(ISV): This is similar to an array data type that stores the
True/False result after comparing the distance reported by each information source
with another as shown in Figure 4.2. If there are more true values reported than false,
then the valuation function for ISV exists.
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5. invariant2- As shown in Figure 4.4, communication can be made between two
platoons. In this case, the A, B and P form an information path, since each car
is equipped with the proximity sensors. VP has information of {x, y}. Similarly, VA
has information of {x, zA} and VP has information of {y, zB}. Now we would send
back this information to VA and VB and VA will have information of {x, zA, zB}. If
zA is not equal to zB, then no valuation function exists for invariant2; otherwise, it
exists.
6. beaconi: it gives information of speedi and velocityi of vehicle i in the platoon.
Figure 4.2. InfoSourceValidator (ISV)
follows an enumeration of checking sources against both other sources and invariants
combining multiple source
4.4.1. Single Platoon. Let us assume that no other platoon exists nearby and there
are multiple vehicles in a single platoon. We would now have communication from other
cars. The cars would communicate with each other using a beacon. The beacon would now
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Figure 4.3. Network vs invariant
The vehicles can calculate the distance covered in t1 − t2 interval using the latitude(lat) and
longitude (lon) coordinates as well as by using the equation distance= speed*time
Figure 4.4. Multiple platoons
be another information path to the control unit and would help in detecting vulnerable path.
Case 4: Let us see if our model will be able to detect if a car is giving wrong information.
The beacon is giving incorrect information (i.e., ¬beacon=True).
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Table 4.3. State description when invariant is added
φi state description
φ0 σ0 Control unit is controlling the car
φ1 σ1 Control unit accepts command from networks
φ2 σ2 Control unit accepts command from sensors
φ3 σ3 Control unit accepts command from invariant1
φ4 σ4 Control unit accepts command from beacon
φ5 σ5 Control unit accepts command from invariant2
φ6 σ5 Control unit gets result from ISV
1. w |= (∃ V cd(n)) Control unit accepts command from network.
2. w |= (∃ V cd(s)) Control unit accepts command from sensors.
3. w |= (∃ V cinvariant1) Control unit receives information from invariant1.
4. w |= ( V cbeaconi ) Control unit receives information from beacon.
From 1, 2, 3 we get
5. w|= ∃V cISV .
From 5 we get,
6. w|=∃V cd(c)(w)
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W:w ` (¬ beaconi⊕ISV)∧[w |=(∃V cd(c)(w)∧ V c¬d(c)(w))]
Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong and determine that the beaconi is responsible for the incorrect
data being transmitted. In this way, we would be able to detect if a vehicle in the platoon
has been compromised.
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Let us now look at the case where there are multiple platoons as shown in Figure 4.4. Here
we have an information path from the adjacent platoons. These information paths help us
in detecting an incorrect data path if more than one information path is compromised.
4.4.2. Multiple Platoon. As shown in Figure 4.4 let us consider that there are more
than one platoon.
Case 5a: There are different platoons, and each platoon has some number of vehicles and
¬beaconi = True.
1. w |= (∃ V cd(n)) Control unit accepts command from network.
2. w |= (∃ V cd(s)) Control unit accepts command from sensors.
3. w |= (∃ V cinvariant1) Control unit receives information from invariant1.
4. w |= ( V cbeaconi ) Control unit accepts information from beacon.
5. w |= (∃ V cinvariant2) Control unit receives information from invariant2.
From 1, 2, 3, 5 we get
6. w|=∃V cd(c)(w)
MSDND (ES) = ∃wεW:w ` (¬beaconi⊕invariant2)∧[w|=(∃V cd(c)(w)∧V c¬d(c)(w))]
Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong and determine that the beaconi is responsible for the incorrect
data being transmitted.
Case 5b: Let us consider that there are two paths that are compromised. For this case let us
assume that the sensor (¬d(s) = true) and the beacon (¬beaconi = True) are compromised.
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1. w |= (∃ V cd(n)) Control unit accepts command from network.
2. w |= ( V cd(s)) Control unit accepts command from sensors.
3. w |= (∃ V cinvariant1) Control unit receives information from invariant1.
4. w |= ( V cbeaconi ) Control unit accepts information from beacon.
5. w |= (∃ V cinvariant2) Control unit receives information from invariant2.
From 1, 3, 5 we get
6. w|=∃V cd(c)(w)
MSDND (ES) = ∃wεW:w ` (¬beaconi⊕invariant2)∧[w|=(∃V cd(c)(w)∧V c¬d(c)(w))]
MSDND (ES) = ∃wεW:w ` (¬d(s)⊕invariant2)∧[w|=(∃V cd(c)(w)∧V c¬d(c)(w))]
Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the valuation function ∃V cd(c)(w)
exists.
In this way, we would be able to use the information from other platoons. This
study tries to consider as many information paths as possible to detect the compromised
information path. Platoons are considered to detect if a vehicle has been compromised
because Case 4 was able to detect the compromised vehicle without a platoon, but if there
are other sources that are compromised, then having this additional source could be helpful
in detecting an attack.
4.4.3. Multiple Platoons With Lane Angle Detection. Now, let us assume that
the model has an additional feature of being able to calculate the angle at which each vehicle
is located. We can use techniques as discussed in [17]. These help in obtaining the angle
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information and we can use the equation c2 = a2 + b2 − 2abCosθ.
From Figure 4.5:
invariantang(θ) = θ1 + θ2 (4.2)
c2 = a2 + b2 − 2abCosθ (4.3)
Figure 4.5. Detecting the angle
As shown in Figure 4.5, VP can calculate the distance between VA and VQ using the
above information . By using this information vehicle VP can verify against the information
sent to it by VA and VQ and by the information stored in the communication network.
Case 5c: Let us assume that the information sent out by vehicle VQ is faulty (i.e.,
¬beaconVQ = True)
1. w |= (∃ V cinvariantangA ) Control unit of vehicle VP receives the angle information of
vehicle VA.
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2. w |= (∃ V cinvariantangQ ) Control unit of vehicle VP receives the angle information of
vehicle VQ.
3. w |= (∃ V cd(s)A) Control unit receives distance information of vehicle VA.
4. w |= (∃ V cd(s)Q) Control unit receives distance information of vehicle VQ.
5. w |= ( V cbeaconVQ ) Control unit receives distance information of beaconVQ .




MSDND(ES) = ∃wεW:w ` (¬beaconVQ⊕invariantang)∧[w|=(∃V cd(c)(w)∧V c¬d(c)(w))]
Case 5d: Let us assume that there is a fault in the communication network, i.e., ¬d(n) =
True
1. w |= (∃ V cinvariantangA ) Control unit of vehicle VP receives the angle information of
vehicle VA.
2. w |= (∃ V cinvariantangQ ) Control unit of vehicle VP receives the angle information of
vehicle VQ.
3. w |= (∃ V cd(s)A) Control unit receives distance information of vehicle VA.
4. w |= (∃ V cd(s)Q) Control unit receives distance information of vehicle VQ.
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5. w |= (V cd(n)Q) Control unit receives distance information of vehicleVQ from network.




MSDND(ES) = ∃wεW:w ` (¬V cd(n)Q⊕invariantang)∧[w|=(∃V cd(c)(w)∧V c¬d(c)(w))]
Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong and determine that the V cd(n)Q is responsible for the incorrect data
being transmitted.




4. invariant1 which computes the distance travelled by the vehicle using distance =
speed ∗ time
5. invariant2 which uses the distance sensors of the vehicles nearby as seen in Figure
4.4.
6. invariant3 which uses the angle between vehicles to compute the distance as seen in
Figure 4.5
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We have seen cases where the attacker is able to modify less than half the number of
information paths.
4.4.4. Attacker Is Able To Modify Three Information Paths. Let us now look
at cases where the attacker is able to manipulate three information paths. Since this attack
compromises three information paths, two case scenarios arise.
1. Attacker can change the value of these three paths to the same incorrect informa-
tion(easy to detect as shown in Case 6a)
2. Attacker can change the value of these three paths(difficult to detect as shown inCase
6b)
For the following two cases we can consider any three paths to be compromised.
Let us name the compromised information paths as compin f o1, compin f o2, compin f o3
and the three correct information paths as path1, path2, path3.
Case 6a: Let us assume that the three compromised paths have different values.
1. w |= (∃ V cpath1) Control unit accepts information from path 1.
2. w |= (∃ V cpath2) Control unit accepts information from path 2.
3. w |= (∃ V cpath3) Control unit accepts information from path 3.
4. w |= ( V ccompin f o1) Control unit accepts information from compromised information
path 1
5. w |= ( V ccompin f o2) Control unit accepts information from compromised information
path 2
34
6. w |= ( V ccompin f o3) Control unit accepts information from compromised information
path 3
From 1, 2, 3
7. w|=∃V cd(c)(w)
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W: w `  (d(c)⊕¬d(c)) ∧ [w |= (∃ V cd(c)(w) ∧  V c¬d(c)(w))]
Therefore, it is not Nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong and can also determine the information path responsible for the
attack.
Case 6b: Let us assume that the three compromised paths have similar values.
1. w |= (∃ V cpath1) Control unit accepts information from path 1.
2. w |= (∃ V cpath2) Control unit accepts information from path 2.
3. w |= (∃ V cpath3) Control unit accepts information from path 3.
4. w |= ( V ccompin f o1) Control unit accepts information from compromised information
path 1
5. w |= ( V ccompin f o2) Control unit accepts information from compromised information
path 2
6. w |= ( V ccompin f o3) Control unit accepts information from compromised information
path 3
From 1, 2, 3
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Table 4.4. MSDND analysis results for a single car
Case Information Path MSDND Vehicle Status
1a d(n) is not compromised No Secure
1b d(n) is compromised Yes Not Secure
1c d(s) is not compromised No Secure
1d d(s) is compromised Yes Not Secure
2a d(n) is compromised No Secure
2b d(s) is compromised No Secure
3a d(n) is compromised No Secure
3b d(s) is compromised No Secure
3c d(i) is compromised No Secure
Table 4.5. MSDND analysis results for platoon
Case Information Path MSDND Vehicle Status
4 beaconi is compromised No Secure
5a beaconi is compromised No Secure
5b d(s) is compromised No Secure
Table 4.6. MSDND analysis results for multiple platoons
Case Information Path MSDND Vehicle Status
5c beaconi is compromised No Secure
5b d(n) is compromised No Secure
7. w|=∃V cd(c)1(w)
From 4, 5, 6
8. w|=∃V cd(c)2(w)
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W: w `  (d(c)1⊕¬d(c)1)∧ [w |= (∃ V cd(c)1(w) ∧  V c¬d(c)1(w))]
MSDND (ES) = ∃ w ε W: w `  (d(c)2⊕¬d(c)2)∧ [w |= (∃ V cd(c)2(w) ∧  V c¬d(c)2(w))]
Therefore, it is not nondeducible secure because the control unit can deduce that
something is going wrong, but cannot decide which set of information paths are compro-
mised.
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Table 4.7. MSDND analysis results for multiple platoons where three paths are compro-
mised
Case Information Path MSDND Vehicle Status
6a Compromised paths giving
different values
No Secure





The main focus of this thesis is on securing the connected vehicles and platoons
of connected vehicles. Minimizing the number of assumptions would be our first step
ahead. We also need to handle cases where more than half of the information sources are
compromised. We will try looking into cases where two sets of information sources give
the same set of incorrect information. There are many scenarios to be considered, such
as: lane changing, platoon joining and platoon split. There is currently no technology to
simulate them in a real scenario: We can only look at case scenarios and validate if the
mathematical model would work.
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6. CONCLUSION
MSDND is useful to model attacks where the goal is to hide critical information
from an attacker rather than to steal information. MSDND secure is bad for the system and
good for the attacker because information can be hidden by making it impossible to evaluate
the desired question or the actual valuation function can be falsified to produce an invalid
valuation, thus making the information MSDND secure and undetectable.
A model that has fewer number of states where MSDND secure is possible is a
good cyber-physical system. In our model, most of the cases are not MSDND secure which
makes our CPS a good model. We can also observe that if we have more information paths
such as the invariant and beacon, detecting an attack is easy.
As we have seen, the invariant plays an important role when the regular information
paths such as sensors, networks and beacon are compromised. We have three invariant
equations:
1. distance = speed ∗ time
2. c = a2 + b2 + abCosθ
3. invariant2 as discussed in section 4.
We have also shown how the model is efficient in various scenarios and how this
model handles the various security threats as discussed in section 3. The attacker now has
to corrupt multiple information paths to compromise the system but then too we have shown
a case where other information paths can be used to indicate which path is compromised.
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No system is 100 percent secure and in this research work, the model fails if we
have more than n/2 compromised paths where n is the total number of information paths.
We have also assumed that the invariant is always true but for some models the invariant
equation may have variables that are computed based on components of the model. We
have tried to make a model that is difficult to attack and tried to develop a security model in
such a way that it provides more security and resilience against attackers.
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